Tuesday, September 10, 2013

Rav Kafach: Israeli monetary law determines halacha

The following excerpt is taken from Justice Elon's Mishpat Ivri (volume IV pages 1761-1762). It asserts an interesting rationale why secular Israeli law regarding money can be binding according to the halacha. This is important especially on the issue of divorce settlements where halacha and secular law greatly diverge.
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A particularly instructive approach to the relationship between Israeli statutory law and Jewish law is taken by Rabbi Yosef Kafah. a member of the Rabbinical Court of Appeals and a major halakhic authority in the State of Israel. Rabbi Kafah's position is expressed in the leading case of discussed further below. In commenting on statements made by the district court as to the nature of statutory provisions expressly made applicable to the rabbinical courts as well as the general courts, he said:
It would seem that these statements concerning "laws explicitly directed to them [the rabbinical courts]" are based on a perception that the Legislature has acted to require the rabbinical courts to reach decisions that are contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, many people share this perception, but their logic begs the question. They assume the premise that these laws require the rabbinical courts to reach decisions that are contrary to the laws of the Torah, and on the basis of that premise they conclude that the law "violates pure halakhic considerations." But this conclusion is not inevitable; rather, the law should be viewed according to its plain meaning.
Section 1 of the Woman's Equal Rights Law provides: "The same law shall apply to women and men with regard to every legal transaction." Section 5 provides: "This law shall not affect the religious law in matters of marriage and divorce.26

The plain meaning of these provisions is that the Legislature established a binding rule only with respect to monetary matters, in regard to which it perceived the existing law as discriminating against women .... The legisla­ tive mandate is manifestly based on the assumption that legislation as to monetary matters would not affect religious law, since the legislation is con­ sidered "a stipulation as to a monetary matter"; therefore, it is not a [prohibited] stipulation to contract out of a Biblical norm. Consequently, it may be assumed that the Legislature had no intention to interfere with anything that is not "a stipulation as to a monetary matter." This is an instance of an ap­ proach that can lead to a proper understanding of a number of statutes that have not been so understood.27

In other words, just as under Jewish law there is freedom of contract, i. e., the parties to a legal transaction may agree on terms contrary to a particular halakhic rule, provided the agreement concerns a "monetary matter" (mamon) and not religious law (issur) ,28 so a statute of the Knesset, enacted in the name of the people by their elected representatives, is in the nature of an agreement by the people to conduct their affairs in accordance with the legislative provisions. As long as the matter does not concern religious law, such an agreement is fully effective even if it is contrary to a particular halakhic rule." This interpretive approach by Rabbi Kafah. which is particularly significant in that it is taken by a leading rabbinical court judge and important halakhic authority, is applicable not only to the particular question dealt with in the Nagar case but also, as explained more fully below ,to the broader question of the relationship between the rabbinical courts and the general legal system of the State of Israel.30

15 comments :

  1. Needless to say, this goes against normative Halacha whereas we pasken that Shulchan Aruch/Choshen Mishpat overrides secular law on monetary matters as a matter of rule.

    Even according to the distinct minority (who we don't follow halachicly) that say we accept seculat monetary law, they are only referring to monetary TRANSACTION issues, where two (or more) parties enter some kind of financial contract or transaction. Even they admit it does NOT apply to monetary matters that are NOT a result of a transaction. Such as who owns what property (for example) when there was no transaction or contract. An example of where they must admit Shulchan Aruch applies is who owns what money/property upon divorce. Since a marriage is not a transaction that determines or transfers a persons assets, a divorce is not a financial transaction. And S"A rules.

    For example, if the husband earned $500,000 during the course of the marriage from his work income, he never agreed at any point before, during or after his marriage that he accepts secular law as binding. So the wife has no halachic right or justification to take even one penny from that money or property of his upon divorce.

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    1. Remember, secular law allows a secular court to seize property a man indisputably owns (he earned it as work income, its in his personal non-joint bank account, or he used it to purchase a property in his own capacity) and give his seized money or property to his ex-wife.

      This is a simple case of the secular court seizing his property and giving it to her. Clearly this violates Torah Law any way you cut it.

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    2. Let me understand this. You two anonymous clowns know more about halakha than Rav Kapach who sat on a Beit Din with Rav Ovadia Yosef and Rav Eliashiv?

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    3. Yourjokingright: An anonymous clown like yourself knows more about halacha than the Shulchan Aruch and all the Rishonim and Achronim that Rabbi Kapach disagrees with?

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    4. Dan,
      He is not disagreeing with a halacha. He is interpreting the halacha.

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    5. "An anonymous clown like yourself knows more about halacha than the Shulchan Aruch and all the Rishonim and Achronim that Rabbi Kapach disagrees with?"

      First you have to prove that he is disagreeing with them. Making such bold claims without proof is absurd. What is more it would seem that if both Rav Eliashiv and Rav Ovadia Yosef were willing to sit with him on a Beit Din that he undoubtedly knows the Shulchan Arukh and Rishonim better than you, and adheres to them more than you.

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    6. More likely is that Justice Elon misunderstood Rabbi Yosef Kafah.

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  2. Sounds like the approach of R Hayyim Hirschensohn in Malki Bakodesh (sorry I dont have the exact source.) He went a bit further by stating that certain Halachic concepts can also be governed by the will of the people, or their leaders.

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  3. Even if this whole assertion had any truth to it, surely this would require the knesset to be composed of entirely jews who follow halocho? How can a knesset with the majority still non shonrei torah u mitzvos elected by the same have such power? Frankly sounds very week to me.

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    1. a stipulation as to a monetary matter need not be made by shomrei torah any more than business norms needs to be established by shomrei torah. They, too, are binding according to halacha because halacha recognizes that people can legislate for themselves. So long as everyone can vote, there is a good basis to suggest that in a democracy legislation is binding.

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  4. The brisker rov said regarding those who criticized rav pesach tzvi for joining the rabbanut that since he lost children to starvation they could not judge him. However he is believed to have said that it was impossible to render decisions always in accordance with halocho while your employer who pays your salary is motivating positions kneged hatorah

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    1. stan, if you bought a car or real estate in USA or in Israel, would you abide by the local secular laws? For example the deeds for the property, the lease or registration on the car? The price etc? Then if you had a problem with the car, and you went back to the seller, would you show the legal documents, proof of purchase etc? The terms of the contract will impact your halachic ability to do anything.

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    2. I have read all of maller's books and never seen this... Please bring source

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    3. What about Rav elyashiv? His salary was paid by the government and when he retired, he got a pension from the government which he never gave up.

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  5. Rav Kapach was a gaon. Very interesting explanation here - clear, logical, and to the point. Thanks for posting it.

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